The Holt narr,ative and the industrial relations agenda l"ony Si 111 pson* l"hc histor~y of the indust.rial relations systcn1 in Nc\\ Zealand is the history of dynan1ic tension bet\~'t!en trade unions and en1ployers. That in it~clfis an unexceptionable staten1ent: it is true of any industrial relations systcn1. It is the source and nature of that dynan1ic tension 'A hich characterises a particular systen1. In ' this country that soun;c and nature is often seriously n1isunderstood. It is depicted by the tnedia (for the obvious reasons associated\\ ith their position \\'ithin the nexus or relationships'" hich n1akc up the don1inant consciousness) and by n1ost acaden1ic historians (largcl) in1plicitly as an inarti~ulate n1ajor pren1ise) as an offensive auen1pt on the part of the unions to elbov.' theirv.'ay into an inappropriate control role v.'ithin the political and indu trial culture and as a defensive respon~c on the part of employer organisations and successive go\ ernn1cnts to prevent this. The source of this depiction and the reasons for its persistence are interesting but rather outside lhe scope of this paper although they deserve to be canvassed at son1e point. Just no\v I \\fe:rnt to suggest an alternative model \Vhich 1 believe to be n1uch tnorc sustainable on the facts. This is one in v/hich for the past century n1ost industrial re' lations initiatives have been taken by en1ployers and these have been directed to excluding organisations ofv.rorkers fron1 the political and : induslrial consensus. This has been a notion largely unexplored by historians. again for fairly obvious reasons. although to a practitioner in the business such as myself it ·een1s a fairly straightforn~ard conclusion sitnply on the facts. Equally.like all conclusions. it is a partisan one but of course no less valid for that. I \vouldn "t see the" arid in the san1e way as an en1ployerand they should not expect n1e to(although strange)) enough son1eofthe rov.·diest dogfights l"ve got intO in negotiation fron1 tinle to tin1c have been 0\Cr an insistence h~ en1ployer representatives that th~n~ is a single reality and it is the one ' lhcy can see and no other). I think the Treasul) ha\ e the san1e problen1 at the present tin1c. This process of attack upon unions has been largẽly supported by the ele1nents Y. hit:h n1ake up the political cul'turc and has only been halted or r\!versed \\'hen such initia'tives have tran ·gresscd beyond the lin1its of acccp'lahility in1posed by that political culture. Within this cont~xtthc activities of unions have been largely defensive and have been characterised by an alrnost pathological craving for respectability as an accepted elen1ent in the consensus.
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flaving said that.. of course. I should n1ake it clear that there arc n1any ~hades and varieties of opinion an1ong both unions. cn1ploycrs and their respective groupings. That's true over tin1e as '"ell as at any point. But ifs also n1ore true of unions. One of the things\\ hich characterises Ne\\ Zealand en1ployers is the rcn1nrkable congruence. con istenc} and Ionge' ity of their explicit basic agendas. The only thing v. hich seen1s to change over tinlt! as far as they arc concerned is the extent of that expfi,~itncs~. At presentlhe} are rather anon.! explicit than is usually the case.
• During the past century the trade union n1oven1ent has. not\\ ithstandin~ achieved their object and then onl) partially for brief periods bet" een 1 S90 and 1895 and 1937 to 1949. and it son1etirnes seen1~ in spite of ralhcr t.h an hccause of its best efforts. This is so at odds ·with the perception of trade unions in lhe;; popular itnagination thHllt requires ~on1e cxigesis. Jan1cs l·lol(!) ('oiHJHib,ory arbit~ation in Ne'tt' Zealand: thejirsrfony ye(l/." \ provides a rran1ework \\ithin "hich that l:an be presented .
l'his franle\vork is not. ho\vever. con1plete. It seen1 to n1e to be n1issing three crucial elen1ents.l~he first of these obvious' ly enough is that the book covers the first forty year only. Thus the narrative. although a lucid exposition of the developn1ent of the arbitration and concil· iation syste:rn during that period does not encon1pass its con1plete pan. Secondly. th.e book does not ~learly enough expound the origins of the systen1. ' Instead it seerns to have 1t en1erge as if frorn a crysallis. Finally, the narrative is hern1etic in the sense that no consistent pattern of n1eaning en1erges fron1 it which relates it to the broader political sce~1e. This is .in tenns neither of parallel industrial relations syste:n1s \Vh ich existed and have con tan ued to exast alongside the fran1evvork of the Act of 1894 and its successors. nor of the prevailing political culture during the period prior to and during the operations of the Act fron1 1894 to 1934 or thereabouts. An exploration ofthese additional din1ensions place. Holt's narrative in context. In this paper I \vant to concentrate on the origins of the Act of 1894 because in those origins lies the key to n1ost subsequent developn1ents in the indu trial ysten1.
l~hat industrial systen1 as it \\'as introduced in 1894 is hased upon certain assun1ption concerning the nature of hun1an r, elationships. in conjunction with a liberal-dernocratic rnocle) of the role of the tate in society. l~hese assurnptions are basically four. Firstly. that industrial disputes bet\veen ernployers and cn1ployees are resolvable and can be resolved by ~tccess to conciliation and arbitration rnachinery by either party but usually in practice by unions V.'h ich are often the in i tin tors of change and which are usually (at though not alv..'ays) the \veaker party. This is V. . 'hat is tneant by conlpulsolJ' arbitralion in practice hO\\ever it n1ay he defined in la\v (context is usual.ly rnore definitive than text). This also incorporates the belief 'that disputes can be prevented in the first place by establishing legal n1inin1un1 \\ages and condition ... of \\'Ork.
Secondly. this presuancs in its turn that the en1ployees n1ay best act collectivel) through union s or on1e other agency and therefore the creation of such rather than being an undesirable con piracy to invade the natural rights ofen1ploye:r and interrupt the 1nechanisn1s ofth~ labour n1arket should be actively encouraged.
Thirdly. that the state representing 'the con1n1unity at large should ensure fair play and if ei t h cr party to the equation :is able h)'ti p the ha lance in its favour then the state should reel ress it. 1-lo\vcver. the state has inHnt:diatcly no place in the day to day relations between unions and \VOrkcrs and en1ployers: its role is confined to ~reating the tnachinery for the resolution of such disputes as Inight·arise, and ensuring by legislation that certain 'f~undan1ental protections of \vorkers as to hours. holidays and safety are preserved. The state reserves the right only to intervene dire~tly \Vhen there · i a perceived clear and present challenge to its authority or to the operation of an essential social service. Such intervention have in fact been relatively rare and have also. at lea~t in n1y observation or upon n1y reading. been upon the ha "'is of a false perception ofthe existence of such a threat. One thinks for in tanc, e of the : invocation of the Public Safety Conservation Act in 1951 or n1ore recently and to speak of matters in which I have been a direct participant, the several threats by the Muldoon govcn1n1cnt to derecognisc the PSA. 1 an1 sure of course that the pol · iticians involved in those instanees were perfectly well <l\\'are that no such threat existed as tha't v.rhich they conju:rl!d up. In the case of the derecognition of the PSA. the bluff \VetS called. l 'he Holland goven11ncnt had rather n1ore succcs .
Fourthly and underpinning these otht>r presun1ptions is a belief that this \vhole activity occurs inside rather than outside the political process. This in1plies that organisations rcpresentingenlployers and unions should be incorporated in the political consensus as a rnattcrof course. It is irnportant that the significance of this underlying assun1ption should be clearly gra .. ped. What is n1eant by the political proce . and cuhure should not be confused \\'ith the n1uch n1ore restricted con1pa of the den1ocratic parliaanental)' sy tcn1 \\hich is only one din1ens. ion of it. I arn referring to the very n1uch broader and less fon11al structure through '''h ich po\ver is exercised V.'ith in our society. This n1eans that paradox icall) \Vh ile the in trod uction for exan1ple of industrial arbitration at the instance of inglc partie. distances the industrial re: lations sphere fron1 the parl · iarnẽnHli)' process. this brings industrial activity clearly \Vithin the broader political consensus and n1akes i't an integral part. of the public cultures of po\ver. The four presun1ptions I have outlined thereby create a place for trade unions within that consensus that they rarely actually enjoy. Equally not all others \v: ilhin that consensus ~~elcotnc that potential presence ns a tnatter of course.
Consequently the accepla nee of these presumptions after I 890 V.. 'as not a phenon1enon conjured out ofthin air~ nor is ' I R90 an absolute \Vatershed · in that regard. The debate in1plicit in these assurnptions · v..,as proceeding prior to that date and · i the praxis within which the creation of the 1894 industrial re: lat· ions legislation : is to be under toad. Its inu11ediate occasion \vas the cconon1ic and political response to \Vhat has becon1e known to hi torians and econon1i ts a the ·Long f)cpression·. the cconon1ic decline which persisted in one forn1 or another between 1870 and ' I X95.
l~hc cconotnic indicators of this period arẽ sufficiently kno\vn and too\\ idely available to require a dctaileJ staten1ent Briefly rehearsed. the basis of the problcn1 (as al\\'ays) \vas a reversal in the tern1s of trade which disadvantged the Nev.r Zealand econo:n1y. Although there \vas a continuous rise in quantity of output the value of this output declined by about a third per capita during the period. Because the principal exports \Vcrc wool and Vlheat and this was rcnectcd in the pattern of large-scale land ownership and the relationship that bore to the banking and finance ystetn. invcstn1cnt capital dried up and there \a. as '''idcspread retr, enchn1ent. This. in its turn~ entailed unen1ployn1ent \Vith consequent social distress in a co:n1nrun.ity \\ith no n1achinery for its alleviation. Statistical infonnation is hard to con1e by because fe\\' ade4uatc stati tics \\'ere kept.. but those\\ h ich \\'ere indicate the results clearly , enough. Between 18R I and 1886 the crnployn1ent ra'lio ot\von1en to n1en ro~ e fro1n one in seventeen to one in five: \Vagcs fell precipitously in son1c industrial occupations: l~ours of ' \VOrk increased in son1e industries to n1ore than ninety a \NCek: and unen1ployn1ent as a proportion of the total \\'Orkforcc rose (in Christchurch '"'here the total population in H~83 was 15~915 . . there were 700 known u nen1 ployed at the height oft he su n1 n1cr busy season.l fthe \VOrkforce was about40~(, of total popu ' lation this gives a very rough une: 1np' loyn1etrt rate of ll~o (Sutch. 1966 (a) pp. 58-81 ).
I should perhaps qualify the preceding paragraph by also not· ing that not all \vages fell 'in the san1c " 'ay. Son1e categofi, es of skilled \Vorkers n1aintained their rates better than others. A revie"' by Roth for instance of the daily rate for carpenters and joiners bet,veen 1876 and 1890 (aHhough it does not take account of length of working day) sho\VS that. although there ,~· as a fall of20~n or thereabouts over the period. this \\'as no\vhere near as great as for unskilled \VOrk. The differential effect of econotnic depression on various categories of \Vorkers is \\'idely rernarked: the 1880s \\'ere not n1aterially different fron1 today. The rate paid for any particular occupation is a reflection of the relative scarcity of the \Vorkers in question. Unskilled process workers 'lend to fare worst~ others n1ay even in1prove their position. The relative scarcity of easily accessible figures for a century ago n1akes definitive con1parisons difficult.
The econon1ic response to this period of distress was predictable in a pre-Keynesian age. Such econo:n1ic troughs \\'erẽ \\'idely considered to be natural phenon1ena concerning vlhich little could be done: indeed it \\'as believed to be hannful to interfere. Govcrnn1ent action should be confined to reducing deficits or as it \vas more con1n1only known in that period. balancing the budget. It should be recollected in that connection that the governn1ents itntnediately subsequent to 1890 \\'ere no different to their predecessors. l'he L. iberal group can1e to po"'er. in~ofar as they had a national progran1n,e at all~ con1n1itted strongly to retrenchn1ent.
ln the event 1hc econon1y did right itself but this owed little to Liberal fiscal polic) (\\ ith the possible exceptjon of their rescue of the Bank of New Zealand). We need in considering the period. ho\vever. to distinguish carefully bet,veen economic and political responses to the long depression. As '"-'C are aptly r~n1inded by Sutch: .. Before 1870 it "as doubtful \Vhether NeY. Zealand \\,ould becon1e a viable country: after 1890 the doubt about cconotnic viability " 'as retnoved hut. 'the question of\vhethcr the country \Vas worth living in had still to he decided" (1966(b) ). The latter aspect of this neat division encon1passcs the pol· itical response.
Th · is occurred at t\\O levels. the parliarnentary and the industrial. Son1e n,etnhers of the political class. i.e. those\vhoconstitutcd the parlian1entary recruiting ground. had by the lSHOs becon1e thoroughly perturbed by the social consequences of econon1ic turndo\vn. Expressions of concern \\'ere not confined to those '''ho '''ere later to be at the centre of\vhat becan1e the Liberal govẽrnn1ents. But one ofthos, e " 'ho did, Robert Stout 'vill serve as an ex, enlplarofthat concern. Stout began as an orthodox Benthan1ite liberal. He thought the state should not interfere under any circun1stances in social or econon1ic n1atters. Bet\\een 1875 and ' 1890 his views undcn\ ent a profound change. By 1886, for exan1ple, he \vas able to say in a debate over an Eight Hours Bill: "'The state n1ust protect those who require protection. 1 f you have strife bet\veen labour and capital.\\ h ich is the stronger oft he t\\'O? Of course capital is the stronger. and the state 111 ust con1e in and assist labour\vhcrever it can .. (l)arliarnentaty Debates. 1856~ 55, p. 558). He thought that it \Vas up to unions to organise and protect their n1ernbers as far as possible. but where this failed the governrnent n1ust take a hand. ~'hat changed the n1inds of Stout and rnany rniddle-class people . like h ' irn was the evidence before their eyes of the \\*idespread distress caused hy leaving things to take care ofthen1selves. They honestly believẽd that v. hen they came to a ne\\ land they had left behind then1 such social cankers as industrial and class conflict cconon1ic exploitation" and so forth. The revelations of the S\veating Con1n1iss. ion which provided only the rnost d:ran1atic evidence that their presun1ption \\as '\v:rong \Vas profoundly shocking to n1any hitherto con1placent n1iddle-class colonists. What they felt i also sun11ned up in a speech by StouL this tin1e in June 1889: ··He confessed that it \Vas \\'ith great sadnes' " he Sa\v such a n1eeting. ' When he left the old land he had felt as others had-that in con1ing to a ne\v land he \Vas con1ing to a country that would be rid of the evils that had tonnented the land of his birth~ and yet be~ore his colony was fifty years old these troubles \\'ere affecting its inhabitants:· (Han1er. 1963. p. 93) .
Nor " 'ere atten1pts :in parl'iatnent to n1itigate this distress by protective legislation confined to post-l R90 governrnents. There v.rere unsuccessful Eight Hour Bills in 1885. I 886 and J 889. There \vere equally abortive aHen1pts at shop and factory legislation in the latter year. Earlier atten1pts had been n1ore successful in protecting apprentices and \\'On1en at least at Ia\\'. although by the 1880s these \Vẽre being \\'idely ignored. In 1882 and 1884 notvlilhstanding.la\VS \Vere enacted prot.ecti ng \\'ages. Most of these atternpts had con1e to grief on the rocks of an intransigent opposition by ernployers \Vho successfully blocked rnost efforts to create effective n1achinery lo enforce factory legislation. and " 'ho \vere actually successful in 1885 in having the . legal hours of ernployn1ent extended.' Employers in association with landowners were well-organised in Reforn1 Associations and these took a din1 view of atternpts to in1pose lin1itations on th~ir itnrnecliate relations \Vith their en1ployees. En1ployers had been unable to prevent the setting up of the Sweating Con1n1ission in 18S9 (although they victin1iscd those \vhogaveevidence in frontofit.) (Roth and Hanunond, 1981. p.33) . Nor could they top Hislop. the MinisterofEducation in the Atkinson governn1ent introducing factories. shop. truck . . and en1ployer liability legislation in 1890. But they could and did kill this legislation in lhe Legislative Council. \Vhere n1any en1ployers" friends and representatives lurked both prior to and aft· er ' 1890 (Sinclair~ 1965. pp. 109-1 II) .
The introduction of a Shop and Factories Bill of 1890 stin1ulated a counterpetition to the Legislative Counci ' l s· ignecl by 279 rnanufacturers. shopkeppers and otheretnployers in Canterbury describing the proposal as .. altogether unnece sary. harassing. and calculated to injure trade and industry:· An1ong instances of its · injurious clause \\'ere cited provisions requiring separate rOOI11S to be sel aside for \\'Orkcrs to eat their lunches. ("·oppressive and irnpracticablc .. ). and payrnent for holidays ("'a serious tax on rnanufacturers and ernployers of labour"') (Sutch. 1966{h) . p. 75).
Most interesting of all \Vas a private Strikes and Board of Conciliation BiH presented by I)O\\'nie Ste\vart.. subsequently a pron1inent men1ber of the anli-Liberal Opposilion. This did not pass eithec although it was supported by other prorn inent anti-Liberals such as Russell \vho led the Õpposition against Seddon in the 1890s. All of these initiatives were actuated by the \Videspread belief that connict bel\veen c· la ses could be. indeed should be. avoided by the cr· eation of arbitration and, conciliation rnachinery and against a backdrop of international debate on the sa n1e therne.-
The political and industrial response of workers to the distress of lhe long depression is parallel 'to but quite distinct fron1 the pattern of n1iddle cia s parlian1entary response delineated above. It \Vas not n1oreover a specifically trade union response in its n1ost significant n1anifcstation. which " 'as then as nO\\' not to con1bine but to re-en1igrale.
ln the eight years 18X5 to 18X9. 125.000 persons left New Zealand. n1ostly for Australia \vh ich " 'as experiencing sornethi ng of a boon1. By 1890 over a thousand people a n1onth " 'ere leaving the country. This clearly constitutes an industrial response but has nothing to do with trade unions. Insofar as there was a trade union response. il " 'as reforn1ist nol revolutionary. It " 'as ahnost indeed excessively intent upon its constitutionality. This has been obscured by an ob ession by historians \Vith the so-called Maritin1t: Strike in I 890 which is perceived to be the crest of a rni' litant \Vavc and the culrnination oft he agitation by social · ist union organisers over the pr· evious several year . There is hardly an historian \vho does not accept this fran1e of reference. Conservative \Vhigs such as Sinclair share con1n1on ground with Liberal vlhigs like Sutch on this at least. Follo\~'ers of both schools echo their n1aster · voices. Certainly Holt seen1s to accept it as a given and it runs as an historiograph · ic then1e through the essays on lhe subject in the recently published Conunon Cause ( 19R6). In their ··The New Zealand Labour rv1 overnc n t 1880-1920" Olssen and Richardson attribute the growth of u n ionisrn in the 1880s to the innuence of largely rniddle-class ideologues. Sinclair in his standard history speaks of 'the leavening effect of Brit.ish trade unionists an1ong the Vogel irnn1 igrants or as being Hirnported (Olssen~ 1987) . This has concluded that the industrial strife usually a sociated \Vith th · is period wa· as n1uch a response to employer auen1pts Lo redefine units of\\'Ork and to depress the rate for each unit as it \vas an ideological attack on capital or the systen1 of arbitration. By 1911 the auernpted defence had been ovcrn'hcl n1ed and the events of) 912 nnd 1913 · were a worker response to vengeful provocation by cn1ployers. l~herc is evidence to suggest that in a restricted nurnber of industries the san1e thing " 'as going on in 1889 and 1890. Bollinger~s ('1968) history ofth· e Ne"' . Zealand Sean1en"s l Jnion Against the J¥ind is a par1:icularly valuable source of inforn1ation which sustains this interpretation. That is to say \\'Orkers organised then1selves in the Maritin1e Council to defend their traditional organi at ion of \\'Ork but were ovenvheln1ed and confronted by widespread ernp. loycr victin1 . isation of trade unionists as a re ult.
One of the difficulties in dctern1ining the relative innuenccs of the various trade.., union groupings in the late eighties and early nineties is the con iderahle variation in estimates by hi torians of precisely ho\\' n1any organi. ed v.·orkers there \\'ere at this period. In 1891 the Ne'N Zealand census records that about 58 percent of the occupied rnales \Vere \\'age-earners or unen1ployed.Anotherestin1ate calculates that about41 percent ofthc population were earners (ahhough not aU of course \\'ere v.ragc-carncrs). The \\'hole population " 'as son1ev. hat over half a n1illion. Although there are no speci'fic statistics to tell us ho\v rnany potentialy might have belonged to trade unions. they cannot have an1ounted to n1uch less than 150.000. But how n1any ofthen1 actually belonged to trade unions and to \Vhich ones? Most. authorities seen1 to agree that there v.rere relatively fev~' organ· ised \vorkers in Ne\\' Zealand in the n1id to late 1880s. For 1888 the figure is set as lo\\' as 3,000 (by Roth. 1973, repeated in Roth and Harnmond . . 1981) and 5.000 (quoted by Holt fron1 a urriversity thesis ofRussell) . l~his eerns rather few in relation to the \vorkforce even taking · into account the effects on union n1en1bership of \Videspread uncn1p' loyn1ent (it usuaHy reduces it rnarkedly) and the · exclusivity of the con1position ofn1o t craft unions. During 1889 and 1890. ho\\'ever., \vhatever n1ay have been the base figure. membership seerns to have expanded spectacularly. Holt cit, es 7 union in Auckland in 1889 becon1ing34 by late 1890 \Vit.h a total of5.000 n1en1bers. \Vood records the forn1ation of 12 ne\\' unions in 1890 adding 12.250 to existing unionists for an ·estin1ated"total of20.000 by the end of the year although he does not source this cstin1ate. Roth and Han1n1ond give 20.000 for 1889 rising to double this figure by nlid-1890. and for the Maritin1e Council a1one quote Millar. the Cou neil secretary as cla i:n1 i:ng 63.000 n1crn bcrs in Õctober 1890, although they caution that this is .. aln1ost certainly an exaggeration" (1981. p. 34). Can1pbell in a 1975 article quotes the Lyttelron Thnes (syn1pathetic editorially under Reeves to unions) as saying that there were 21.300 unionists in the country of,vhonl 9.000 \Ver· e in the Marititne Council affiliates (Bollinger in his hi tory of the Sean1en's Union says 8.000 at the point offon11ation and rapid growth thereafter). And Salmond ( 1950) . in a history of the unions at this period cites 3 . . 489 workers in 18 unions affiliated to Trades and Labour Councils in Dunedin in August 1890 and 2.000 n1en1bers in 8 affiliated unions in Christchurch in Decernber 1889 (later joined by raihvay and agricultural \VOrkers. nun1bers unspecified). He does not give a nationa' l figure nor figures for \A/ellington or Auckland. , Obviously all these estin1ates cannot be right. Nevertheless they aliO\\' son1e conclusions to be dra\\'11.
' Discounting Millar's clain1 for the Maritin1e Council, accepting even the n1osl optin1istic 'figures n1akcs it clear that only a fraction of the workforce \Vas u:nionised. never n1ore than about a fifth and probably n1uch less than that. If the Mariti1nc Council disposed of about a third ~f organised \~orkcrs (taki~lg fheLyttelton Tilnes_as a conten1poral)' estirnate and ther, eby rnost hkely to be rehable but ernng on the generous s1de). that arnounted to about six or seven percent of the overall \Vorkforce. Bearing in n1ind that one of its : largest affiliates. the ASRS did not by and large take part in the di putes of 1890. this puts lhe Marilirne Strike in some sort of perspective. At it~ heighl it \vould have barely affected n1ost " 'orkcr . At n1o t it v.'ould have been son1ething they read about in the newspapers. It n1ay be that as a result of its having happened at all .. frightened conservatives heard the tran1p of workers· boots. smelt the sn1oke and sa\v the flan1es of socialist revolt··. to quote Sinclair(l965, p. 106) . but conservatives are notorious in such circun1stances for seeing and hearing things that no-one else. least of all the union n1oven1ent. can hear and see. l'hat the Maritin1e Strike has bulked so large since has been tnainly because oft he inability of historians to get the sn1oke out of their nostrils. I would suggest that \Vh ile the defeat oft his strike contributed to the subsequent un· ion pressure for the introduction or conciliation and arbitration. the n1ain reasons for that pressure were n1ore prosaic~ an appreciation of relative industrial weakness and palpable distress an1ong trade union n1e:n1 bers.
In n1y view. Holfs assessrnent of the significance of the Maritin1e Strike stands at the threshold of a reassessrnent of the traditional vie\\' as expounded by Sinclair and others. He accepts that in sorne ways it wa a footnote to an Australian affair . . and that Millar " 'as no rnilitant advocate of: industrial action (\\'hich is not to say 'that he was no radical). But not\vith-standing this he expresses surprise that there was not n1ore picketing and attendant violence {\~.thich he apparently thinks is an inevitable acco:n1panirnent to such).
He goes on to suggest that ""the possessing classes .. as he describes then1 were not only afraid that this \Vas a harbinger or \Videspread social disruption but that they \\'ere righl to think so. And ultin1ately he suggests it \vas the Maritirne Strike which \\ 1 as the crucial \\'atershed in union consciousness bel\\'een the adherence to industrial n1eans of the achieven1ent of objects and the rejection of this in favour of political rneans to the san1e end. That is to say he has retr, eatecl into the traditional interpretation of historical events.
\~' hat \Ve do knO\\' is that the ernployer response to challenges by 'trade unions in this period \\' 3 in1n1ediate and sharp. It \Va not only the n1aritirne en1ployers \Vho forced hun1iliating tern1s of surrender on Miller and his friends. Any active unionist \Vas liable to victin1 isation by blacklisting and even as late a 1895 the conservative Trades and Labour Councils \\ere virtually inoperative. Organ , ised labour both before and aner 1890 was characterised by its wcaknes and unions needed no :industrial defeat in 1890 to telJ then1 that political activity \\'as their only salvation. They \verc , encouraged to this by the reappearance of the Reforn1 Associations at the lX90 election. l 'hesc vlere largely coalitions of landO\\'ners and en1ployers con1-n1illed to substantial cuts in social expenditure, retr1oval ofn1any tariiTbarriers to free-trading and a cessation of borrO\\'ing. They naturally also opposed the passage of factory and other indu "trial legislation. In response the Trades and Labour Councils. particularly in the South Island. encouraged the fonnation ofPeople~s Political Associations to ensure the election of candidate syn1pathetic to \VOrking people. These groups contributed significantly to the election of a ne\\' parliarncnt in 1890 \vhich provided the rnajority group frorn \vhich \vas to grO\\' a Liberal Party . . Although these union-based politica ' l a sociations had no national policy as such~ they had con1prchensive notions of\vhat they expected of the ne\\' governrnent \Vhich took office in 1891. These included nationalisation of'land~ railv.,ays. rnines and coastal shipping. work schen1es for the unen1ployecL factory acts and con1pulsory arbitration (Sinclair. 1965 ). The progran1n1es differed fn. 1n1 centre to centre. l~hc Wellington platforn1 of October 1890 for instance called for repeal of the property tax: introduction of a land tax; an elective Legislative Council~ leasehold tenure of cr0\\'11 lands~ no in1n1igrant labour: the preservation of the ~ducat ion systern fron1 retrenchtnent and the addition of a ne\v systen1 of technical training. In Christchurch a n1onth earlier the progran1n1e called in addition to sin1ilar policies for labour and factory legislation (Saln1ond~ 1950, p. 13 ' 1). But all these progra:n1n1es tended in the a:n1e general d. irection . . During their first parlian1entary tern1 and inlo their second. these pol' itical debts " '' ere paid by the governn1ent first of Ballance and then of Seddon under the rni nisterial aegis ofWillian1 Reeves. Minister of Justice and ulti n1ately of Labour.
l~hi ' " 'as not as straightfonvard as n1ight be in1agined. The outgoing Atkinson governn1ent had stacked the Legislative Council \vith n1e1nbers syn1pathetic to the Reform Associations. l~his group for the next four years consistently opposed labour legislation. The Liberals had to convince the Colonial Office to overrule the Governor, Lord Glascow. who refused to appoint further n1cn1 hers oft he Council to hal a nee those appointed hy Atkinson before they could pass n1uch of th~ir progran1n1e into laY-'. Reeves· first atten1pts at labour legislation were either throv.'n out entirely by the Legislative Council or so n1utilated by then1 as to be virtually unrecognisable. These included shop hours, \\'Orkn1en ·s I ien~ truck and factory bills. There was no doubt \\ 7 here the opposition \\'as corning from. , Opposition MPs Buckland, Duthie and Fergu spoke for the ern ployẽrs associations ' in conden1n · i ng the proposed laws as ·"at best rneddlesome interference, at worst ... the enslavemen ' l of the people·· (quoted in Sinclair. 1965. p. l3R) . Even Willian1 Rolleston. generally cnl· ightened in n1attcrs of labour legislation a_t least said in parliarnent of these bills: .. , 'think that they prcsun1e too n1uch upon an antagontsm of · en1ploycrs and en1ployed. and too little upon the n1utual understanding that. ought to subsist between then1." (Parlian1enlary ' l)e' hates. 1891.. 72~ p. 582). Others '"'ere rnore forthright. The Shop Act which ai:n1ed to restrict the hours which women could be required to \\'Ork degraded then1 and took away their liberty. sa· id Buckland. When Reeves circulated a proposed arbitration law the oppos· ition of en1ployẽr associations \Vas so ferocious that he did not even bother to introduce it ir1the House. He tried again in 1892 but his proposals for reforn1 were simply blocked by the Legislative Council.
l ·hese propo!)als included an arbitration a<.:t " 'hich had l\VO in1portant features. There was provision forcornpulsory and legaHy binding arbitration of disputes if conciliation failed . . and equally in1portant but son1etin1es ignored . . this process could be initiated only by registered trade unions. This not only pJaced a J. egal weapon to force settlen1cnt of disputes by third parties in the hands of unions but encouraged the forn1ation of such associations as a first step in that process. The significance of this latter which has been n1isunderstood by some comnlentutors is crucial to an understanding of the Liberal approach to industrial tnatters. The intention was to assist working people to hc. lp then1selves by con1bh1 ing into collective associations . . not to intervene on their behalf. The role of the state was to ensure fair play as disinterested referee. En1ployers who were the stronger party in industrial disputes did not see the n1atter in quite that light and their opposition to both aspects of the legistation was virulent and bitter. This dre"' an equally strong response fron1 organised worker. In August 1892 the Wellington Trades and Labour Council reacted to the rejection of labour bills by the Legisla-'live Council by resolving: .. That thi · Council viev.'s 'Nilh astonishn1· ent the detern1ined hostility of the Legislative Council to labour nl· easure as sh0\\'11 by the rejection of Labour n1embers of the Council .. (San1ond, 1950. p. 132) . Reading conten1porary ne\vspaper accounts. even allowing for lhc rather slaid journa.li tic periods of the day, it is difficult not be to in1pressed by the heal these issues generated.
In 1893 Reeves confined hirnselfto non-arbitral industrial legislation. In 1894. as Minister of Labour · in a governn1en'l returned \Vith a thun1ping n1ajority and the auton1atic veto of the L· egislative Council largely ren1oved. he returned to the charge in introducing his revised Industrial Conciliation and Arb: itration Bill. As \vith his proposal of 1892 it ain1ed to encourage the fonnation of unions and to prevent strikes. This l\\'in ai:n1 has puzzled son1e historians (including Sinclair in his biography of Reeves (1965) . and in his other \\'ritings: but not including one of his n1ajor critics OI · iver ( 1969)~ in his extren1ely interesting essay ··Reeves. Sinclair and the Social Pattern'· in which there is a very clear exposition of how those two things · fit together). misled by the popular rnisconception that the forn1ation of a trade union is inevitably follo\ved by an exponential increase in industrial action. This notion that if there were no unions there would be no slrikes has certainly been the orthodox ideology of employers over the succeedingcentury.lt \\'as not the philosophy of Reeves and the Trades and Labour Councils. On lhe contra I)' · in a ren1ark which sun1s up the vie"' of both . . Reeves had said of con1pulsory arbitration in the House in 1893 his proposal was .. a kindly solution of the natural " 'arfare bet~'een classes". In the teeth of continuing and rancorous opposition frotn en1ployers. landowners and their parlian1entary spokesn1en . . the arbitration legislation \\'as passed. In the event and as the pattern of industrial events has shO\\'n since in Ne\\' Zealand, Reeves and the T'radcs and Labour Councils predicted n1ore accurately than their opponents. This has not reconciled en1ployers (except for a brief and exceptional period bel\l. 'een 1908 and 1913) to the philosophies of arbitration. As a coda to that one 1night at a pinch include the ten years or so fron1 the n1id-fifties, but I don't think so. Full en1ployn1e:nt and a constantly rising level of real incon1es n1eant only that the issue subn1erged but belo\v the surface it ren1ai ned lively enough. One needs only :for instance to revie\v the battles in the state sector around the t\\'O McCarthy Con11nissions of 1962 and 1968 to be in1n1ediately a\varẽ of this.
JronicaJiy the growing success of the progran1n1es of the People·s Political Associations can}e at the very mon1en't at ~~hich the political consensus " 'hich had produced the election victories of1890 and 1893 for the Liberals was breaking up and was being replaced by another which ' \\'as not nearly as congenia ' lto political :initiatives on behalf of organised labour. This br· eak \Vas already apparent before the 1893 election at least in son1e centres. Saln1ond (p. 132) records a curious resolution passed by the Wellington Trades and Labour Council in July: ··That the secretary infonn the Liberal Association that its action in setting up an Electoral Con1111ittee as constituted is calculated to create a pern1anent schisn1 bet'\veen the Labour and Liberal parties. and that if this should occur~ the Trades Council " 'ill hold the Liberal Association prin1arily responsible."' Thi followed n1eetings bet,veen the t'vo \vhich had failed to resolve serious differences over the incorporation of labour planks in the Liberal platfon11 for \VelJ:ington.A further effort to reach an agreed electoral platforn1 also failed with the result that the overall Liberal vote in Wellington fell and only two Liberals ~'ere elected (although one of these \Vas Sir Robert Stout \Vho was to lead the left Opposition to Seddon over the next fe~ years).
After the election the rift beca1ne n1ore pronounced as businessn1en~ of whom Ward was the exe1np.lar~ can1c increasingly to dominate party counsels. The Auckland Star, leading Liberal daily \vas by 1895 editoralising against : Reeves for .. legislating ahead of public requir. en1ents·· and this opinion \Vas endorsed by Seddon (Sinclair 1965. p. 217) . Other. less friendly ne"' -papers \Veighed in. and Reeves· colleagues ~'ere in son1e instances openly hostile.. ··1 am sorry lo ay if"~ one of them. \\' il'lis. Strid later in the sa· me year ... but I an1 getting sick and tired of so n1uch labour legislation ... I do not think this continual tinkering " 'ith labour legisla'tion is conducive to the best interests of the colony ... The L· iberals \\fcre learning the fundan1ental les on of New Zealand den1ocracy: retaining po\ver n1eant holding together an electoral coalition of sn1all business1nen. sn1all fanners and the urban petit bourgeois and this was not ahvays con1patible 'Nith the industrial needs of trades union n1en1bers. Fron1 1895 union in1lucnce on the political systcn1 entered an eclipse fron1 · which it was not to recover until the first Labour governn1t!nt took office in 1935. With it went any hope of effectively protecting and consolidating the gains n1adc at the political level bet\\'een 1891 and 1894. The period between 'then and 1935 is. as Holt so clẽarly delineates. a series of retreats for organised labour in the face of en1 player intransigence.
For the en1ployers in genera · l had never -have never -accepted as legitin1ate ''hat happened bel\veen 1891 and 1894. Like the ancien ~egitne they had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. As Sinclair(l961) has rernarked of the labour legislation oft he period: ··The cohservatives bluntly called it ·socialisrn·. For in l\vo respects this legi lation was \vhat people then n1eant by the tern1. Fir til \Vas prin1.arily of benefit to crnployers rather than en1ployers. and seerned to nervous capitalists to be a blo'" at profits. Secondly it involved a notahlẽ CX'tension of the po,vers of the state ... This rev a nch ist philosophy has in fanned the basis of ern ployer initiatives since. Unless it is apprehended that the en1ployer agt:nda in the century succeeding has been to roll back t.he union successes of the 1890s (sornething they still insist on labelling 'socialisn1·) then the history of industrial relations in that period is barely to be co: 1nprehended at all.
